Exploration of the Transformation Models of Village-Level Industrial Parks in Guangzhou from the Perspective of Power Relations
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摘要: 聚焦于广州市村级工业园改造,从权力关系的视角出发,分析不同利益主体间的互动及其对改造决策的影响,揭示运营主体主导、政府主导和村集体主导三种改造模式的机制特点和效果差异。运营主体依托其经营权,通过提供专业服务和优化硬件设施,推动企业发展和资产增值;政府则利用管理权,通过政策引导和资金支持,促进产业升级和空间提质;村集体则凭借所有权,注重集体经济的发展和社区环境的改善。通过分析这三种模式在权力基础、主要目标、主体利益出发点、产权配置、风险分配、获利方式和期限、重点改造内容、权力互动机制等方面的差异,进一步解析其权力关系的作用路径和空间效应,同时揭示了权力关系的非单向性和多维性,提出在选用改造模式时要遵守“权力适配”的原则,所选用的改造模式需匹配区域当前发展阶段,并综合考虑各利益主体权益。Abstract: This paper examines the transformation of village-level industrial parks in Guangzhou, with particular attention to the role of power relations in shaping decisions. It explores how various stakeholders interact and influence the transformation process, identifying three distinct modes: those led by operating entities, by the government, and by village collectives. The operating entities utilise their management rights to foster enterprise growth and increase asset value by providing professional services and improved facilities. In contrast, the government employs its administrative powers to promote industrial upgrading and enhance spatial quality through policy guidance and financial support. Meanwhile, the village collectives focus on developing their collective economy and improving local community environments through their ownership rights. This paper examines the differences among these three modes in terms of power bases, main objectives, stakeholder interests, property rights configurations, risk allocations, profit mechanisms and timelines, key transformation content, and power interaction mechanisms. It further examines the operational pathways of power relations and their spatial effects. The paper reveals the multidimensional and non-unilateral nature of power relations, proposing adherence to the principle of “power adaptation” when selecting a transformation mode. The chosen mode should align with the area's current development stage while comprehensively considering the rights and interests of all stakeholders.
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